Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entry Markets by Matsumura, Toshihiro & Matsushima, Noriaki









 REGULATED INPUT PRICE,  
 VERTICAL SEPARATION,  
 AND LEADERSHIP  
 IN FREE ENTRY MARKETS  
 
 
 Toshihiro Matsumura 

















The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
 
Regulated input price, vertical separation, and leadership in
free entry markets∗
Toshihiro Matsumura†
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo
Noriaki Matsushima‡
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
August 9, 2012
JEL classification numbers: L51, L13
Key words: network industry, access charge, manipulation of accounting, regulation
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Basic Research from the
Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. Needless to say, we are responsible for any remaining
errors.
†Toshihiro Matsumura, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo, Tokyo
113-0033, Japan. E-mail: matsumur@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
‡Corresponding author: Noriaki Matsushima, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University,
Mihogaoka 6-1, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan. Phone: +81-6-6879-8571. E-mail: nmatsush@iser.osaka-
u.ac.jp
Abstract
We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge ac-
counting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm
holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access
fee) to provide final products. The bottleneck facility holder affects the regulated input
price. We investigate how vertical separation affects the incentive for manipulation and
the resulting input price. We find that the results depend on whether the incumbent is the
Stackelberg leader in the product market. If the incumbent cannot take leadership in the
product market and faces Cournot competition, vertical separation reduces the incentive
for manipulation and the resulting input price. The opposite result is derived when the
incumbent can take leadership in the product market.
1 Introduction
Competition between a firm holding essential facilities (usually a dominant firm) and firms
not holding them has been widely observed in many industries such as overnight delivery,
telecommunications, electric power, and natural gas distribution. In particular, dominant
firms in Japan are not vertically separated in the telecommunications, electric power, and
gas distribution industries. Dominant firms were previously legal monopolists, and they have
competed against new entrants since the liberalization of these markets. In these network
industries, new entrants pay an access fee to the dominant firms. This access fee affects the
new entrants’ marginal costs and thus significantly affects the performance of the markets.
The access fee is typically regulated by the government. Considerable literature on the
desirable and/or existing rules for levying the access charge, such as the efficient component
pricing rule (ECPR), the total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC), and a historical
cost approach, exists;1 moreover, charges based on the costs of essential facilities are currently
levied all over the world. For example, in Japan, TELRIC has been adopted by traditional
local telecommunications, while the historical cost approach has been adopted in the optical
fiber networks, electric power, and natural gas distribution industries. In the EU, although
the rules are different for different countries, cost-based approaches have been adopted in most
industries and in most countries.
In practice, however, firms often influence the regulated input price (access charge) by
manipulating the accounting costs, whereas in principle, the rule for calculating the access
charge is determined by a neutral government and there is no room for manipulation.2 For
instance, using a dataset on state campaign contributions by telecommunications companies in
1 For a general description of the access charge, see Vogelsang (2003) and Rey and Tirole (2007). See also
Laffont and Tirole (1994), Economides and White (1995), Hausman (1997), Armstrong and Vickers (1998), Ida
(2001), Sappington (2006), and Higgins and Mukherjee (2010). Further, see Hori and Mizuno (2006), Mizuno
and Shinkai (2006), Ida and Anbashi (2008), and Gautier and Mitra (2008) for the dynamic efficiency of access
charge rules.
2 For discussions on these activities in the general context of regulation policies, see Viscusi et al. (2005).
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the United States, de Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) find that there is a correlation between
the relative levels of contributions by firms and the level of local loop prices (regulated access
prices). In Japan, integrated gas companies insisted that the costs of vaporizers and pumps of
liquidated natural gas (LNG) tanks should be included in the access charge accounting for gas
distribution pipeline networks. They made substantial efforts to rationalize their argument
in front of the Gas Energy Committee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resource and
Energy, the agency that determines the rules for access charge accounting. These companies
succeeded in persuading the committee to adopt a resolution to include these costs in the
access charge and maintained that resolution for more than 15 years. Similar instances have
been widely observed in the telecommunications and electric power distribution industries in
Japan. In this paper, we consider a situation wherein the access charge is influenced by the
firms holding the bottleneck facilities.3
Another important policy topic is whether dominant firms should be allowed to hold
essential facilities. Vertical separation is always an important policy issue in this field, and
legal and ownership unbundling has been widely observed, especially in the EU. It is often
insisted that vertical separation is beneficial because it deters manipulation by vertically
integrated firms.
In this paper, we discuss the means by which vertical separation affects the regulated input
price. First, we formulate a model in which n firms (firm 1, firm 2,. . ., firm n) compete in a
final product market and one monopoly input supplier, firm 0, holds an essential facility. The
number of firms is endogenously determined (free entry market). Firm 1 is the incumbent
firm (formerly legal monopolist). We compare two situations: firms 0 and 1 are vertically
integrated (vertical integration case) and no firm is vertically integrated (vertical separation
case). We also consider the two cases concerning the leadership of the incumbent firm, firm 1.
One is the Stackelberg model in which firm 1 can commit to the output level before the entry
3 Baron (2001) emphasizes the importance of those nonmarket strategies including lobbying, self-regulation,
and corporate social responsibility.
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of new entrants (firm 2,. . . , firm n), and the other is Cournot model in which all downstream
firms (firm 1, firm 2,. . ., firm n) produce independently.
Whether the existing incumbent firm takes leadership in the downstream market is an
important matter in deregulated industries. In some cases, the historically incumbent firms
have dominant positions (Weisman (1995), Sarmento and Branda˜o (2007)), implying that
those incumbent firms take leadership in the downstream markets; thus, considering Stack-
elberg competition is reasonable for researchers. In other cases, such incumbent firms do
not have significant market shares (Beard et al. (2001)), implying that considering Cournot
competition is reasonable for researchers. The difference between the market positions of
historically incumbent firms crucially depends on how to deregulate those former regulated
markets, entry conditions, technological properties, and so on. We therefore think that com-
paring the two competition modes (Cournot and Stackelberg) is important in the context of
deregulated markets.
We find that the effect of vertical separation crucially depends on whether the incumbent
firm takes leadership in the product market. If the incumbent cannot take leadership at the
product market, vertical separation reduces the incentive for manipulation of accounting and
thus reduces the resulting regulated input price. On the contrary, if the incumbent can take
leadership at the product market, vertical separation increases the incentive for manipulation
and thus raises the input price. Thus, to reduce the manipulation and to stimulate new entries
by vertical separation, eliminating the leadership position by the incumbent is important.
We explain why Cournot and Stackelberg yield opposite policy implications for the vertical
separation policy. First, consider the Cournot competition (where the incumbent, firm 1,
cannot take leadership). Under vertical integration, an increase in the input price reduces
other firms’ outputs and thus increases firm 1’s output. This production substitution increases
the profit of firm 1, and thus firm 0, the holder of bottleneck facility, has a stronger incentive
to manipulate the input price because firm 0 maximizes the joint profits of firms 0 and 1
under vertical integration. This effect disappears under vertical separation. This is why
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vertical integration stimulates the manipulation by firm 0. Next, consider the Stackelberg
competition (where the incumbent, firm 1, can take leadership). As discussed in Etro (2006),
the incumbent produces aggressively, regardless of the input price. Thus, in contrast to
the Cournot case, the strategic effect of raising the input price disappears under vertical
integration. On the other hand, an increase in the input price reduces the output and the
profit of firm 1, but firm 0 does not take this reduction into account under vertical separation.
Thus, firm 0 has a stronger incentive to raise the input price. This is why vertical separation
stimulates the manipulation under Stackelberg competition.
We review related papers. There are two research lines that are closely related to our paper.
One is the literature on strategic commitment in free entry markets. Etro (2006, 2007) clearly
shows that the incumbent leader engages in aggressive strategic behavior to restrict new entries
in free entry markets in a general context. He derives many important policy implications
in the context of competition policies.4 We introduce this strategic behavior in the context
of vertical separation/integration policy and regulated input prices. The entry restrictions
in markets with a bottleneck facility have been significantly weakened. We observe the new
entry of private firms in these markets such as the electric power, natural gas distribution, and
telecommunication markets in many European and Asian countries. Therefore, the analysis
of free entry market in this context is quite important.
The other research line is the literature on raising rivals’ costs. In the literature on verti-
cally related industries, many works have already pointed out that vertically integrated firms
have strong incentives to raise their rivals’ costs. Economides (1998) investigates Cournot
competition in a downstream market and shows that the vertically integrated firm has an
incentive to exclude the rivals through a prohibitive access charge. Mandy and Sappington
(2007) show that the vertically integrated firm has an incentive to engage in cost-increasing
sabotage regardless of whether there is Cournot or Bertrand competition in the downstream
4The literature on strategic behavior in free entry markets and discussions of policy implications has become
rich and diverse. See, among others, Branda˜o and Castro (2007), Davidson and Mukherjee (2007), Etro (2008,
2011), Ino and Matsumura (2010, 2012), Marjit and Mukherjee (2008), and Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2008).
4
market, but has a weak (strong) incentive to engage in demand-reducing sabotage when there
is Bertrand (Cournot) competition. The discussions on increasing the rivals’ costs and cost-
increasing sabotage in this context are also provided by Beard et al. (2001) (see also the papers
cited by them). Bustos and Galetovic (2009) discuss a case in which a bottleneck monopoly
endogenously determines its vertical structure (integration or separation) and the degree of
sabotage. Our paper differs in two crucial ways from these works. Under vertical separation,
the upstream firm has no incentive to engage in sabotage activities because these activities
never increase the revenue and thus the profits of the upstream firm. On the contrary, raising
the regulated input price raises the profit of the upstream firm, and thus the upstream firm
has an incentive to raise the input price even under vertical separation. Another and more
important difference is that all works mentioned above assume that the number of firms is
given exogenously, whereas we consider free entry markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model.
Section 3 presents the result under Cournot competition. Section 4 presents the result under
Stackelberg competition. Section 5 checks the robustness of the result in Section 4. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The model without leadership
In this section, we formulate a model wherein downstream firms face Cournot competition
in the final product market. We consider two cases: (1) A vertically integrated firm holding
a bottleneck facility exists (vertical integration); (2) The government undertakes vertical
separation of the firm holding the bottleneck facility (vertical separation).
We consider an oligopoly model. Firm 0 holds a bottleneck facility. Firm 1 is the in-
cumbent firm and firm i (i = 2, . . . , n) is a new entrant. The number of new entrants is
endogenously determined by the free entry condition discussed below. Firm i (i = 1, . . . , n)
uses the bottleneck facility held by firm 0 and pays fyi to firm 0, where f is the input price
(per unit access fee of the bottleneck facility) and yi is firm i’s output. We assume that the
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marginal production cost is constant, common among firms, and normalized to zero (except
for the access fee).
In the first stage, the input price (access fee) f is determined. Let M(f) denote firm 0’s
costs for manipulation of the access charge accounting. We implicitly assume that the input
price is zero if firm 0 does not make any effort. That is, the input price is regulated but can
be affected by firm 0’s efforts.
In the second stage, given the input price, f , new entrants determine whether to enter the
market.
In the third stage, firms engage in Cournot competition. Firm i (i = 1, . . . , n) indepen-
dently produces perfectly homogeneous products for which the market demand function is
given by p(Y ), where Y is the total output of the firms (price as a function of quantity). We
assume that p′ < 0. We also assume that p′′yi + p′ < 0 for all yi ≤ Y so as to ensure that the
reaction curve at the Cournot competition stage is downward sloping (strategic substitute).




yj −M(f), πi = (p(Y )− f)yi −K (i = 1, . . . , n), (1)
where K > 0 is the entry cost. We assume that M ′(f) ≥ 0 and that M ′′(f) > 0 in order
to ensure the concavity of firm 0’s payoff function. We assume that M ′(0) = 0 in order to
ensure interior solutions in the first stage. We also assume that the number of new entrants
is strictly positive under the Cournot competition.
3 Equilibrium outcome without leadership by the incumbent
3.1 Vertical integration
First, we consider the vertical integration case, that is, firms 0 and 1 are integrated vertically
and maximize their joint profits.
Consider the third stage. From (1), the first-order conditions of the firms in the third
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stage are given by
p + p′y1 = 0, (2)
p + p′yi − f = 0, (i = 2, 3, ..., n). (3)
In the second stage, the free entry condition (zero-profit condition) must hold for i = 2, ..., n:
(p(Y )− f)yi = K. (4)
These three conditions in (2), (3), and (4) yield the equilibrium outcome given the regu-
lated input price f . We investigate how a change in the input price affects the equilibrium
outcome. The total differentials of these three conditions are given as
(p′′y1 + 2p′)dy1 +(n− 1)(p′′y1 + p′)dyi +yi(p′′y1 + p′)dn = 0,
(p′′yi + p′)dy1 +((n− 1)p′′yi + np′)dyi +yi(p′′yi + p′)dn = df,
p′yidy1 +(n− 2)p′yidyi +y2i p′dn = yidf,
(5)

















4p′ + 2p′′y1 + (n− 1)p′′yi
p′yi(2p′ + p′′yi)
. (8)














< 0 (i = 2, ..., n). (9)
Note that we have assumed that p′′yi + p′ < 0 (condition for strategic substitute) and p′ < 0.










−M ′(f) = 0, (10)
where i = 1.
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3.2 Vertical separation
Second, we consider the vertical separation case, that is, firm 0 maximizes π0 with respect to
f and firm 1 maximizes π1 with respect to y1.
Consider the third stage. The first-order conditions of the downstream firms in the third
stage are given by
p(Y ) + p′(Y )yi − f = 0, (i = 1, 2, ..., n). (11)
In the second stage, due to the free entry condition, equation (4) holds.
These two conditions in (4) and (11) yield the equilibrium outcome given the regulated
input price f . We investigate how a change in the input price affects the equilibrium outcome.
The total differentials of these two conditions in (4) and (11) are given as
(np′′yi + (n + 1)p′)dyi +yi(p′′yi + p′)dn = df
(n− 1)p′yidyi +y2i p′dn = yidf.
(12)


























Firm 0 maximizes π0 with respect to f . The first-order condition is
dπ0
df
= Y + f
dY
df
−M ′(f) = Y + 2f
2p′ + p′′yi
−M ′(f) = 0. (16)
3.3 Comparison
We now investigate how vertical separation affects the equilibrium outcomes under Cournot
competition. Let the superscripts “IC” and “SC” denote the equilibrium outcomes under
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vertical integration and under vertical separation, respectively (I, S, and C indicate Integra-
tion, Separation, and Cournot competition, respectively).
Lemma 1 Consider the equilibrium outcomes in the second stage given f . Then, for all f ,
(i) yICi (f) = y
SC
i (f) (i = 2, 3, ..., n), (ii) Y
IC(f) = Y SC(f) and pIC(f) = pSC(f), and (iii)
Y SC(f) is decreasing in f .
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that the type of vertical structure does not affect the total output and thus
does not affect the consumer surplus at the free entry market. Because the type of vertical
structure does not affect the total output under a given input price f , it does not affect firm
0’s profit. However, the type of vertical structure affects the profit of firm 1. Thus, it affects
the equilibrium level of f .
Proposition 1 Without the leadership by firm 1, vertical separation reduces the input price
and increases consumer surplus.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that vertical separation reduces the incentive of firm 0 for manipula-
tion and thus reduces the resulting input price. An increase in the input price improves the
competitive advantage of firm 1 and increases the joint profits of firms 0 and 1. Such a strate-
gic incentive disappears when the two firms are separated. This is why vertical separation
reduces the input price. From Lemma 1(iii), this reduction in the input price increases the
total output, which benefits consumers.
In the next section, we show that this result does not hold if the incumbent firm, firm 1,
can take Stackelberg leadership in the production market.
4 Equilibrium outcomes with leadership by the incumbent
In this section, we consider the situation in which the incumbent firm, firm 1, is the Stackelberg
leader. We follow the standard model formulation of leadership in free entry markets discussed
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in Etro (2006, 2007). In the first stage, the input price f is determined. In the second stage,
firm 1 sets its quantity y1. In the third stage, given f and y1, new entrants determine whether
to enter the market. Finally, those entrants simultaneously choose their outputs.
Consider the third and the fourth stages. The first-order conditions of entrants and the free
entry condition are the same as in the previous section. Given f and y1, these two conditions
yield the equilibrium number of new entrants and the output of each new entrant. We discuss
how y1 affects these two variables. Let the superscripts “IL” and “SL” denote the equilibrium
outcomes under vertical integration and under vertical separation, respectively (I, S, and L
indicate Integration, Separation, and the Leadership by the incumbent, respectively).
Lemma 2 Consider the subgame given f and y1. Regardless of f and y1, as long as n > 0,
(i) yICi (f) = y
SC
i (f) = y
IL
i (f) = y
SL
i (f) (i = 2, 3, ..., n), (ii) Y
IC(f) = Y SC(f) = Y IL(f) =
Y SL(f) and pIC(f) = pSC(f) = pIL(f) = pSL(f), and (iii) dn/dy1 = −1/y2.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 2(ii) implies that as long as n > 0, the total output and the price do not depend
on y1. Thus, firm 1 serves as a price taker as long as n > 0. Because the price must be
higher than f when n > 0, firm 1 chooses y1 to deter the entry of new entrants, resulting in
n = 0 under both vertical integration and vertical separation. Firm 1 chooses y1 such that
p(y1) = f + (K/y∗2), where y∗2 = yIC2 = ySC2 . That is, y1 is equal to Y IC(f) = Y SC(f). This
result has already been shown by Etro (2006) for the situation in which f = 0. Under these
conditions, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. Then, no entry occurs under both
vertical separation and vertical integration.
We now discuss how vertical separation affects the equilibrium input price. Under vertical
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integration, firm 0 chooses f to maximize
π0 + π1 = fy1(f)−M(f) + (p(y1(f))− f)y1(f)
= p(Y IC(f))Y IC(f)−M(f),
note that y1(f) = Y IC(f). Under vertical separation, it chooses f to maximize
π0 = fY IC(f)−M(f).
From the equations, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the leadership by firm 1, vertical separation increases the input price
and reduces the consumer surplus.
Proof See the Appendix.
This result contrasts with the result in the Cournot case (Proposition 1). Without the
leadership by the incumbent in the production market, vertical separation reduces the incen-
tive for manipulation, which reduces the input price. On the contrary, with the leadership
by the incumbent, vertical separation stimulates the incentive of firm 0 for manipulation and
thus increases the resulting input price. As discussed in Etro (2006), the incumbent produces
aggressively, regardless of the input price. In contrast to the Cournot case, the strategic ef-
fect of raising the input price disappears under vertical integration. On the other hand, an
increase in the input price reduces the output and the profit of firm 1, although firm 0 does
not take this reduction into account under vertical separation. Thus, firm 0 has a stronger
incentive to raise the input price. This is why vertical separation stimulates the manipulation
under Stackelberg competition.
The two propositions indicate that the market structure is a critical determinant of how
vertical separation affects the input price. If the incumbent occupies the leadership posi-
tion and adopts its strategic behavior before new entry, vertical separation is harmful for
consumers.
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Some readers may suspect that the difference between Propositions 1 and 2 comes from
the difference between the properties of the solutions, not from whether the incumbent is the
Stackelberg leader. No entry occurs in the Stackelberg case (complete entry deterrence, corner
solution), although entry does occur (interior solution) in the Cournot case. This difference
may be crucial. If we replace the assumption of constant marginal costs with that of increasing
marginal costs, entry occurs even in the Stackelberg case. In the next section, we will check
the robustness of our results by considering increasing marginal costs.
5 Robustness check: Increasing marginal costs case with lead-
ership
In the previous section, in the Stackelberg case, we have shown that the corner solution (no
entry) appears in equilibrium if the marginal costs of the firms are constant. In this section,
we consider increasing marginal costs and investigate the situation in which entry occurs even
under the leadership by the incumbent. Let c(yi) be the common production cost function of
firm i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). We assume that c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, and c′′ is large in order to ensure an
interior solution.
Consider the third and the fourth stages. The first-order condition and the zero-profit
condition for each new entrant are, respectively,
(p(Y )− f) + p′(Y )yi − c′(yi) = 0, (17)
(p(Y )− f)yi − c(yi) = K. (18)
From almost the same calculations as in previous sections, we can show that Lemma 2 also
holds under increasing marginal costs. We again obtain that the total quantity supplied by
firms, Y , does not depend on y1. Let Y˜ (f) denote the total quantity in this game. Firm
1 serves as the price taker as long as n > 0. Contrary to the previous case, complete entry
deterrence (n = 0) is not optimal for firm 1 because the marginal cost is increasing in quantity.
Firm 1 chooses y1 such that p(Y˜ (f)) is equal to its marginal cost. That is, under both vertical
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integration and vertical separation, firm 1 chooses y1 such that p(Y˜ (f)) = c′(y1)+f . The type
of vertical structure again does not affect the optimal output of firm 1. Some readers may
think that firm 1’s marginal cost is not c′(y1)+f but c′(y1) under vertical integration because
it maximizes the joint profits of firms 0 and 1 and because fy1 is just a transfer within the
integrated firm. However, an increase in y1 reduces the total output of new entrants by the
same amount, thus reducing the revenue of firm 0 from the rivals. This means that f is the
marginal opportunity cost generated by increasing y1 under vertical integration (Sappington
(2005)).
In the first stage, firm 0 chooses f . Under vertical integration, firm 0 maximizes
π0 + π1 = fY˜ (f)−M(f) + (p(Y˜ (f))− f)y1(f)− c(y1(f)).
Under vertical separation, it maximizes
π0 = fY˜ (f)−M(f).
Comparing the two first-order conditions yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the marginal cost of each firm is increasing in quantity. Consider
an interior solution (n > 0). Under the leadership by firm 1, vertical separation increases the
input price if p′′ < 0. It does not change the input price if p′′ = 0. It reduces the input price
if p′′ > 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
In the increasing marginal cost case, vertical separation can increase the input price and
then reduce the consumer surplus. Vertical separation increases the input price if the demand
is strictly concave. However, the result is weaker than that in the constant marginal cost
case because this result does not hold if the demand is linear or strictly convex. If the inverse
demand is strictly concave, one unit increase in f increases the price at the product market by
less than one unit. Thus, an increase in f decreases the firm 1’s profit (p− f)y1− c(y1). Firm
0 does not care about this effect on firm 1’s profit under vertical separation, implying that
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vertical separation raises f if the inverse demand is strictly concave. However, if the inverse
demand is strictly convex, one unit increase in f increases the price at the product market
by more than one unit. Thus, an increase in f increases the firm 1’s profit (p− f)y1 − c(y1).
Firm 0 does not care about this effect on firm 1’s profit under vertical separation, implying
that vertical separation reduces f if the inverse demand is strictly convex, in contrast to the
concave demand function case.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have considered the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility
and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products. The
bottleneck facility holder affects the regulated input price through the manipulation of access
charge accounting. We have investigated how vertical separation affects the regulated input
price in a free entry market. We discuss two cases: with and without the leadership by the
incumbent firm in the product market. We find that vertical separation lowers the regulated
input price without the leadership by the incumbent firm and that it raises the regulated input
price with the leadership by the incumbent firm. Thus, to stimulate new entry by vertical
separation, eliminating the leadership position by the incumbent is important.
We have assumed that the bottleneck facility holder can affect the regulated input price
by manipulating the costs of the incumbent firm. We do not explicitly formulate a formal
model analyzing the manipulating process. This important topic remains for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 If f = 0, there is no difference between the two cases. Thus, yICi (0) =
ySCi (0) and Y
IC(0) = Y SC(0). Because (7) and (9) are, respectively, equal to (13) and (15),
yICi (f) = y
SC
i (f) (i = 2, 3, ..., n) and Y
IC(f) = Y SC(f) for all f . This implies Lemmas 1(i)
and (ii). (9) implies Lemma 1(iii). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1 Comparing (10) and (16), we have that (10) is larger than (16)
given f because 2p′ + p′′yi < 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Therefore, (10) yields a higher f than (16).
This implies Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 The first-order condition and the zero-profit condition for each new
entrant are common under both vertical integration and vertical separation. Thus, the equa-
tion yILi (f) = y
SL
i (f) must hold. The total differentials of these two conditions (the first-order
condition and the zero-profit condition for each new entrant) are given as
((n− 1)p′′yi + np′)dyi +yi(p′′yi + p′)dn = −(p′′yi + p′)dy1
(n− 2)p′yidyi +y2i p′dn = −p′yidy1.
(19)
From these equations, we have dyi/dy1 = 0 (i = 2, 3, ..., n). Thus, the equation yILi (f) =
ySLi (f) does not depend on y1. For any y1 = y
IC
1 (f), the equation y
IC
i (f) = y
IL
i (f) must hold
because the two conditions (the first-order condition and the zero-profit condition for each new
entrant) in the Stackelberg case are exactly the same as those in the Cournot case. From this
equation (yICi (f) = y
IL
i (f)) and Lemma 1 (y
IC
i (f) = y
SC
i (f)), the equation y
IL
i (f) = y
SC
i (f)
holds. These imply Lemma 2(i).
From the zero-profit condition, we have pj(f) = f +K/yji for j = IC, SC, IL, SL. Lemma
2(i) implies Lemma 2(ii).
yj1 + (n− 1)yj2 is fixed at Y j(f) for j = IC, SC, IL, SL. This implies that dy1 + dny2 = 0.
From the equation, we have Lemma 2(iii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 For expositional simplicity, we denote Y IC(f) by Y (f). Under
vertical integration, the first-order condition for firm 0 is
d(π0 + π1)
df
= Y ′(f)(p′Y (f) + p)−M ′(f) = 0. (20)
Under vertical separation, the first-order condition for firm 0 is
dπ0
df
= Y (f) + fY ′(f)−M ′(f) = 0. (21)
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= −Y (f) + Y ′(f)(p′Y (f) + p− f)
= −Y (f) + p′Y ′(f)(Y (f)− yi(f))




′ + p′′Y (f))
2p′ + p′′yi(f)
< 0,
where we use the first-order condition for each new entrant, p − f = −p′yi, to derive the
second line and equation (9), Y ′(f) = 2/(2p′ + p′′yi(f)), to derive the third line. Because
p′ + p′′y < 0 for all y and p′ < 0, the last line is negative. Therefore, given f , d(π0 + π1)/df
in (20) is smaller than dπ0/df in (21), implying that (20) yields a smaller input price, f , than
(21). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 Because the type of vertical structure does not affect π0(f),
vertical separation increases (decreases, does not affect) the input price if and only if ∂π1/∂f >
(<,=) 0.
The total differentials of the three conditions (the first-order condition for firm 1, the
first-order condition for each new entrant, and the zero-profit condition for each new entrant
(firm i)) are given as
(p′ − c′′(y1))dy1 +(n− 1)p′dyi +yip′dn = df
(p′′yi + p′)dy1 +((n− 1)p′′yi + np′ − c′′(yi))dyi +yi(p′′yi + p′)dn = df,
p′yidy1 +(n− 2)p′yidyi +y2i p′dn = yidf.
(22)











p′(2p′ + p′′yi − c′′(yi)) .
The difference between the differential of π0+π1 with respect to f under vertical integration
and that of π0 with respect to f under vertical separation is
(p′(Y˜ (f))Y˜ ′(f)− 1)y1.
16
Using the result of Y˜ ′(f), we have
(p′(Y˜ (f))Y˜ ′(f)− 1)y1 = −p
′′y1
2p′ + p′′yi − c′′(yi) .
Because the denominator is negative (the second-order condition of firm i), the fraction is
negative (positive, zero) if and only if p′′ < (>, 0). This implies Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
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